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This paper assesses the industrial performance and capabilities of Nigeria over the last 
decade. It explores Nigeria’s export and production capacity, growth, structure and 
technological upgrading and compares it to other Sub-Saharan countries. Evidence 
shows that Nigerian industry is inexorably falling behind and becoming increasingly 
marginalized in the international and regional industrial scene. Total manufacturing 
value added and manufactured exports have significantly declined and there has been a 
technological downgrading of Nigeria’s traditional manufacturing sectors. Moreover, 
increased dependency on oil extraction puts a serious threat to Nigeria’s industrial 
competitive future. Severe flaws in the education system, technological stagnation of 
domestic companies, lack of foreign investment in manufacturing, negligible technology 
transfer and weak ICT infrastructure constitute significant factors for failure. Further 
analysis should however include other factors not explored in this exercise, including 
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Introduction 
Despite having plentiful natural resources, the largest domestic market in Africa, and an 
abundant and cheap labour force, Nigeria’s industrial performance has been highly 
disappointing in the last decade. Between 1990 and 2000, total manufacturing value 
added and manufactured exports have declined, and the country has become 
dangerously dependent on petroleum as the only means to obtain foreign exchange. As 
a result, Nigeria is losing its competitive manufacturing edge and is becoming 
increasingly marginalized in the international industrial scene. Nigeria faces severe 
flaws in its production and export structures, which have been the outcome of 
inappropriate policies, macro-economic instabilities, a distorting business environment, 
lack of transparent governance and weak industrial capabilities.  
This paper presents an industrial assessment for Nigeria. It uses quantitative indicators 
to compare Nigeria’s industrial performance and capabilities to those of other countries 
in the region. The objective of this paper is to position Nigeria in the industrial scene 
and to shed some light on what capability factors may explain its poor performance. 
This paper follows UNIDO’s Industrial Development Report 2002-2003 in its approach 
as it uses its ‘structural drivers’ for industrial competitiveness: human resources, 
technology effort, FDI, technology transfer, ICT infrastructure. It however 
acknowledges that industrial performance is influenced by a wider range of factors, 
which cannot be always measured and therefore escape the scope of this exercise. A 
more comprehensive study on the determinants of industrial performance in Nigeria 
should certainly make use of more qualitative material to improve or question the 
findings of this paper.  
The country comparators used for benchmarking Nigeria’s industrial performance and 
capabilities are: Senegal and Ghana in West Africa; Kenya in East Africa; Zimbabwe 
and South Africa in Southern Africa; and Algeria, Egypt and Morocco in Northern 
Africa. The paper also uses oil exporting economies in the Middle East (Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia and Oman), Latin America (Venezuela and Ecuador), and East Asia (Indonesia) 
to benchmark Nigeria’s performance in the oil industry.  
The paper is structured as follows. Sections I and II set up the conceptual underpinnings 
of the paper. While section I emphasises the importance of manufacturing as the engine 
of growth, section II presents the dynamic competitiveness approach and the 
significance of moving up in the manufacturing technological ladder. Section III 
positions Nigeria in U NIDO’s Competitive Industrial Performance (CIP) index and 
compares it to other Sub-Saharan and oil exporting countries. Nigeria’s industrial 
capacity and growth, and structure and upgrading are analysed in sections IV and V 
respectively. Section VI throws  light on Nigeria’s sectoral performance in resource-
based (oil and food), low-tech (textile/clothing) and medium-tech (engineering) 
manufacturing sectors. Section VII deals with the industrial capabilities as explanatory 
factors to Nigeria’s industrial performance. Finally, section VIII presents the 
conclusions.  
I. Manufacturing: the engine of growth 
There is no doubt that manufacturing remains one of the most powerful engines for 
economic growth. It acts as a catalyst to transform the economic structure of countries, 
from simple, slow-growing and low-value activities to more productive activities that 
enjoy greater margins, are driven by technology, and have higher growth prospects. But 
its potential benefits are even greater today. With rapid technological change, sweeping QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS101  Page 3 
liberalisation and the increased defragmentation and internationalisation of production, 
manufacturing has become the main means for developing countries to benefit from 
globalisation and bridge the income gap with the industrialised world. These are some 
of the many arguments that justify the importance of promoting manufacturing in the 
developing world:   
￿  Manufacturing is growing faster than the primary sector in total world trade. 
Between 1990 and 2000, total manufactured 
exports grew at an annual rate of 6.6 per 
cent, outpacing primary goods exports 
(figure 1). In 2000, manufactured exports 
accounted for nearly 86 per cent of total 
world exports – gaining 2 percentage points 
since 1990. Many primary exports have 
faced declining growth rates in the last 
decade – including many for which Nigeria 
seems to have a competitive edge (i.e. 
cereals and cotton) (UN comtrade). If 
Nigeria is to achieve dynamic 
competitiveness it must increase its 
participation in fast growing sectors that not 
only benefit from higher value added but 
also generate greater externalities to other 
sectors of the economy.  
 
 
￿  Manufacturing is less exposed to external shocks, price fluctuations, climatic 
conditions and unfair competition policies. Nigeria’s economy is very unstable due 
to its dependency to the oil sector – economic growth has often coincided with 
peaks in oil prices. In the longer run however, primary goods exports face declining 
terms of trade due to their low value added relative to manufactured goods 
(Prebisch-Singer hypothesis), and the constant fluctuations in world prices. In 
addition, unfair competition policies have distorted primary goods markets around 
the world. For instance, subsidised farming in developed countries has closed down 
market prospects for primary goods exporters from poor nations. 
￿  Manufacturing is the main vehicle for technology development.  Manufacturing 
represents today the hub for technical progress not just in developed countries but 
also in developing countries. Industry uses t echnology in many forms and at 
different levels to increase returns to investment by shifting from low- to high-
productivity activities. This entails a process of constant technological upgrading 
and learning. In Nigeria, manufacturing should be seen as catalyst to technological 
progress and the main means to achieve higher and more sustainable industrial 
margins.    
￿  Manufacturing drives and diffuses innovation. Research and development (R&D) 
financed by manufacturing enterprises account for the bulk of innovation activity 
carried out in the developed world. But R&D expenditure is only the tip of the 
technology effort iceberg. Manufacturing also offers great potentials for informal 
innovation activities, or ‘clever gimmicks’, such as incremental improvements in 
products and processes. A strong R&D is important for Nigerian firms to absorb and 
modify technologies more quickly and efficiently, adapting them to the local 
conditions and needs.  
Figure 1. Annual growth rates for world 
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￿  Manufacturing has a ‘pull effect’ on the other sectors of the economy. The 
development of the manufacturing sector stimulates the demand for more and better 
services: banking, insurance, communications and transport. Without them, 
manufacturing is unlikely to realise its full potential. In Nigeria, manufacturing can 
be used to stimulate a more productive agricultural sector making use of 
technological advances. Manufacturing can also contribute to help reform Nigeria’s 
weak banking sector through reforms driven by the increased demand of working 
capital for manufacturing activities.    
￿  The internationalisation of production has spread the benefits of manufacturing. 
The spread of multinational corporation (MNC) activity around the globe has 
benefited manufacturing more than any other sector of the economy. The trend 
towards vertical disintegration of production activity in industrialised countries 
means that developing countries can now participate in the global economy by 
inserting themselves into international value chains. This is not easy though, as 
competition to host MNC activity in developing countries is becoming tougher. 
Indeed, evidence shows that only a handful of developing countries have 
participated in global manufacturing activity (UNIDO, 2002). Low FDI in Nigeria’s 
manufacturing sector is a clear sign that the country has so far not benefited from 
the internationalisation of production.  
II. Moving up in the technology ladder: an imperative to achieving dynamic 
competitiveness 
Increasing industrial capacity is the first step towards achieving dynamic 
competitiveness, but it might not be enough. Today countries face more international 
pressures than ever before because the nature of competition has changed: it is now 
more intense and based on a wider range of factors. While price continues to matter, 
particularly in third world markets, factors such as innovation, fashion, quality, 
flexibility, reliability and speed of delivery have become increasingly important. Export 
markets have become so demanding that producers in developing countries feel that 
they are expected ‘to produce at third world prices to first world standards’. Relying 
primarily on prices can lead countries to ‘race to the bottom’ in market segments where 
industrial rents are low and competition high. Achieving dynamic competitiveness 
really comes down to the countries’ ability in increasing industrial capacity while 
shifting production and export structures towards higher value-added and technology-
intensive activities or sectors. This moving up in the technology ladder has proved to be 
more desirable for economic growth for  the following reasons: 
 
￿  Within manufacturing, complex activities are growing faster in trade than simple 
activities (figure 1). Between 1990 and 2000, high technology industries grew by 11 
per cent per annum, outpacing the growth rates experienced by other manufacturing 
sectors. Within high-tech industries, semiconductors have been the fastest growing 
sector (17 per cent) accounting for 5 per cent of world trade in 2000. Medium and 
low-technology products grew at fairly similar rates over the period, though 
medium-tech products, despite some slippage, dominates world trade with around 32 
percent of total exports. Resource based continues to be the slowest growing sector 
within manufacturing, and if we take the period between 1995 and 2000, the decline 
is even more significant (the growth rate for this period is only 3 per cent per 
annum). Within resource based, agro/forest based products are clearly the main 
losers, but still growing a bit faster than most primary commodities (UN Comtrade). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS101  Page 5 
￿  Technology-intensive sectors are less vulnerable to entry by competitors, and 
therefore enjoy higher and more sustainable margins.  Resource based and low 
technology activities are more exposed to competitive pressures as the overall 
capabilities to  enter in the industry are relatively lower and can be met by 
newcomers. Competitive advantages in these sectors often come from price rather 
than quality or brand names. In contrast, technology-intensive activities call for 
more complex capabilities and processes that impose greater barriers to entry. 
Developing countries, including Nigeria, often specialise in labour-intensive sectors 
where labour cost is the predominant competitive factor. The ability of countries to 
scale up in the technology ladder, between or within sectors, will determine their 
capacity to sustain or even enrich margins. 
￿  Technology-intensive activities often offer greater learning prospects and spillover 
benefits to other sectors. For instance, the skills developed in high technology 
sectors have more applicability to other sectors than those skills learned, say, in 
resource based industries. This is of course an oversimplification of the reality, but 
yet it holds truth in many cases. Capabilities in technology-intensive industries are 
grounded in shared disciplines, notably mathematics, physics, engineering, and 
computing. Strong capabilities based on scientific knowledge can be adapted to the 
particular demands of industries at a faster pace. As technology in these sectors also 
changes rapidly, the learning component is always very high. By contrast, in sectors 
where technology hardly changes the learning process is rather limited  
III. Nigeria in UNIDO’s Competitive Industrial Performance (CIP) Index 
UNIDO’s latest flagship report, the Industrial Development Report 2002-2003, presents 
the new competitive industrial performance (CIP) index for 87 countries in two years – 
1985 and 1998. This CIP index comprises in only one indicator several dimensions of 
industrial competitiveness – capacity, growth, structure and upgrading – and is used to 
benchmark countries´ current industrial performance and evolution over time. The CIP 
index is made up of four industrial 
performance indicators: manufacturing value 
added (MVA) and manufactured exports per 
capita, and the share of medium- and high-
tech goods in MVA and manufactured 
exports. T he underlying message behind 
UNIDO’s CIP index is that in order to 
achieve sustainable industrial development, 
countries have to increase their industrial 
capacity in domestic and international 
markets, while also deepening their industrial 
and export structures towards higher value-
added activities and sectors. 
Sub-Saharan Africa lags behind other 
developing regions in all indicators of 
industrial performance (UNIDO, 2002). 
Nigeria is not exception. In 1998 it ranked 78 
out of 88 countries in the CIP index dropping 
3 places since 1985 (table 1). In the region, Nigeria only performs better than Tanzania, 
Malawi, Madagascar, Central African Republic, Uganda, Ghana and Ethiopia. Note that 
even the regional leaders dropped substantially in overall industrial performance from 
Table 1.  CIP ranking for Nigeria a nd Other Sub-
Saharan Countries 
CIP Ranking 
1998  1985 
Country 
39  32  South Africa 
51  38  Zimbabwe 
56  47  Mauritius 
62  64  Kenya 
72  N.a  Mozambique 
75  72  Cameroon 
76  59  Senegal 
77  68  Zambia 
78  75  Nigeria 
80  70  Tanzania 
81  78  Malawi 
82  73  Madagascar 
83  77  Central African Republic 
84  80  Uganda 
86  76  Ghana 
87  N.a  Ethiopia 
Source: UNIDO 2002 
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1985 to 1998 – South Africa by 7 places, Zimbabwe by 13, and Mauritius by 9. Only 
Kenya has improved its competitive position, though this is primarily the result of the 
deterioration in the ranks of other countries in the region.  
Table 2 compares Nigeria’s CIP ranking to 
those of other oil-dependent economies in the 
world. These countries often rank poorly in 
the CIP index due to their dependency on 
natural resources and the low technological 
sophistication of their production and export 
structures. As can be seen, all oil-exporting 
countries (as classified by UNCTAD), have 
lost places in the CIP ranking, excluding 
Indonesia, for the period 1985-1998. Nigeria 
is the laggard among these because, as we 
shall see later, it has neither diversified into manufacturing activities nor has capitalised 
on its oil potential by moving up into more value added and technologically 
sophisticated activities within the value chain. By contrast, other oil-exporting countries 
have made significant progress on these fronts and have coped better with increased 
competitive pressures. 
In sum, Nigeria’s poor showing on the UNIDO index is the outcome of weak 
performance in each of the four indicators of industrial performance: out of 88 countries 
in the world, it ranks 74
th in manufacturing value added per capita, 85
th in manufactured 
exports per capita, 40
th in the share of medium and high-tech products in MVA, and 77
th 
in the share of medium- and high-tech products in total manufactured exports. Given its 
size, Nigeria’s industrial capacity is very low and mainly geared to domestic markets – 
its export propensity is one of the lowest in the world. Though its MVA structure 
appears to be relatively sophisticated, this is a bit misleading given its low MVA levels. 
IV. Industrial Capacity and Growth 
Manufacturing value added is the basic indicator of industrial performance. Let us first 
position Africa and its sub-regions in the international industrial scene. The first striking 
thing that emerges in the comparison is the massive difference in total industrial output 
(annex table 1). Total MVA in Sub-Saharan Africa was almost 2 times lower than in 
South Asia, and 8 and 12 times lower than in Latin America and East Asia in 1999. 
Excluding South Africa the difference doubles. The positive annual growth rates 
experienced by Sub-Saharan Africa between 1985 and 1999 are statistical illusions 
derived from small bases rather than promising signs of industrial growth. And even so, 
annual growth rates are lower than the average for developing countries. There is now 
clear evidence that the region is becoming more marginalised in the industrial scene: 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s MVA share in the developing world has gone down from, already 
low, 5 per cent in 1985 to 4 per cent in 1999.  
Table 2.  CIP ranking for Nigeria and Other Oil-
exporting Economies 
CIP Ranking 
1998  1985 
Country 
42  31  Bahrain 
46  35  Venezuela 
49  65  Indonesia 
54  41  Saudi Arabia 
59  39  Oman 
61  58  Ecuador 
74  54  Algeria 
78  75  Nigeria 
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It is however important to note that significant intra-regional variations do exist. For 
instance, the industrial performance of Northern and East African countries is quite 
remarkable when compared to the rest of the region – both sub-regions have grown for 
more than 6 per cent in total MVA between 1985 and 1998, above the average for South 
Asia and Latin America (annex table 1). By contrast, West and Central Africa have 
stagnated in the last decade.  
Nigeria’s industrial performance has been highly disappointing. Total MVA declined 
from US$ 2.4 billion in 1985 to US$ 1.7 billion in 1999 (table 3). MVA per capita 
dropped from US$ 16 in 1985 to US$ 14 in 1999, one of the lowest in the region. Now 
compare with other countries. Neighbouring Senegal has emerged as a solid industrial 
performer, experiencing growth rates above the average for Sub-Saharan countries – 
mainly due outstanding growth rates between 1985 and 1990 – and over performing 
Ghana and Nigeria. Despite some slippage in the 1990s, Senegal’s MVA per capita in 
1999 was still 6 times higher than that of Nigeria. Take now North Africa. Egypt and 
Morocco seem to have maximised their location advantages to serve and access 
European markets with labour intensive products (especially garments). As a result, 
industrial production in Egypt and Morocco grew at 10.3% and 6.7% respectively for 
the period 1985-99. In per capita terms, they are far ahead of Nigeria. In East Africa, the 
most outstanding case is that of Mauritius. MVA in this island economy has grown at 
13.3 per cent per annum for the period 1985-99, the highest in Africa. Kenya has also 
done quite well, almost doubling industrial output in 15 years.   
MVA is not always exposed to international competition as policies and other barriers 
to trade can limit the exposure of domestic industrial output to international markets. 
Thus, MVA on its own does not capture all the dimensions of industrial 
competitiveness. Export performance nicely complements MVA performance as it 
reflects firms’ abilities to compete internationally as the main means to earn foreign 
exchange. 
As in total MVA, the first striking thing in manufactured exports is the regional 
differences in volume (annex table 2). Manufactured exports in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
excluding South Africa, were about 8 and 36 times lower than in South Asia and Latin 
America in 1998, and 132 times lower than in East Asia. This shows that when it comes 
to export markets, industrial divergence in the developing world is even more acute. 
Sub-Sahara’s manufactured exports share in the developing world went down from 1.1 
per cent in 1985 to only 0.5 per cent in 1998. The average annual growth rate for 
developing countries for the period 1985-98 is 13.3 per cent, almost double than that of 
Sub-Saharan Africa excluding South Africa. None of the African sub-regions have 
experienced higher growth rates than those of South Asia, East Asia and Latin America.  
Table3. Manufacturing Value Added for Nigeria and Selected African Comparators (current US$ million) 
















Nigeria  2,449  1,562  1,752  -8.6%  1.3%  -2.4%  16.3  14.1 
Ghana  519  572  700  1.9%   2.3%   2.1%   37.9  36.8 
Senegal  330  747  808  17.8%   0.9%   6.6%   102.3  89.8 
Kenya  631  862  1,170  6.4%   3.5%   4.5%   36.7  40.4 
South Africa  11,476  24,040  24,914  15.9%   0.4%   5.7%   707.1  593.2 
Zimbabwe  1,023  1,799  953  12.0%   -6.8%   -0.5%   183.6  79.4 
Algeria  5,788  4,597  4,787  -4.5%   0.5%   -1.3%   184.6  159.6 
Egypt  4,519  14,403  17,830  26.1%   2.4%   10.3%   257.2  283.0 
Morocco  2,388  4,753  5,950  14.8%   2.5%   6.7%   206.7  212.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa  23,930  42,341  51,856  12.1%  2.3%  5.7%  94.5  80.6 
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Nigeria’s export performance has been even more 
disappointing. Manufactured exports have 
plummeted from US$ 216 million in 1985 to a 
dismal US$ 88 million in 2000 – only Algeria has 
experienced a decline of manufactured exports in 
the region for that period (figure 1).  This makes 
Nigeria one of the less export-oriented economies 
in the region. Manufactured exports in Nigeria only 
accounted for 0.2% of total exports in 2000, 
declining from already low 1.5% in 1985 (annex 
table 4). This is among the lowest manufacturing 
propensity ratios in Sub-Saharan Africa, and is the 
result not only of declining manufactured exports 
but also an increased dependency on primary 
exports, particularly oil. Indeed, Nigeria’s share of 
oil exports in total exports has increased from 
95.4% in 1996 to almost 99.6% in 2000, making it 
one of the less diversified e conomies within the 
region and in the world.  
V. Industrial Structure and Upgrading 
As already mentioned, all manufacturing sectors are not equally beneficial for industrial 
competitiveness and hence economic growth. Technology-intensive manufacturing 
sectors – that is, medium and high-tech sectors (MHT) – grow faster, have greater 
learning prospects and often breed more externalities to the rest of the economy. They 
generate higher value added and impose higher entry barriers to newcomers.  By 
contrast, simple sectors – i.e. resource-based (RB) and low tech (LT) – generate lower 
and less sustainable margins as competition is much tougher. These sectors – often 
labour-intensive – do not need a strong human resource base and are considered major 
entry points in industry by most developing countries. 
Expectedly, Sub-Saharan Africa has less complex MVA structures, (i.e. MHT products 
in MVA) than the rest of the developing world (annex table 5). Moreover, complex 
structures in Sub-Saharan Africa have hardly evolved for the period 1985-98. By 
contrast, East Asia has the most sophisticated industrial structure in the developing 
world (the share of MHT in MVA is around 55 per cent), followed by Latin America. 
Again, variations within Africa are significant. Central Africa has the less sophisticated 
production structure, and East Africa specialises in LT industries, particularly garments 
. Southern Africa has the most complex industrial structure in Africa, mainly because of 
South Africa, but still simpler than that of South Asia. 
Take now the export structure for Sub-Saharan Africa and other developing regions 
(annex table 6). It is clear that the competitive strength of Sub-Saharan Africa lies in 
resource-based manufactured exports – its share of RB in total manufactured exports is 
45.9% in 1998, compared to 21.4% in South Asia, 24.9% in Latin America, and 12.1% 
in East Asia. Unlike all other developing regions though, Sub-Saharan Africa, excluding 
South Africa, has experienced a downgrading in its export structure as the share of MT 
and HT exports have declined between 1985 and 1998. Annual growth rates for each 
technological category in Sub-Saharan Africa are lower than those for other developing 
regions, not just in complex activities but also in simple sectors. This evidence is even 
more worrying when taking into account Sub-Saharan Africa’s small base in 
Figure 1. Manufactured Exports for 
Nigeria and Selected African 
Comparators 
(US$ million)
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manufactured exports.  Figure 2 presents Africa’s 
share of RB and LT manufactured exports in the 
developing world. Two things are striking. The first is 
Africa’s low share in what it is supposed to be its 
“bread and butter” (less than 3% of the developing 
world market share in 1998). The second is that this 
share has declined for the period 1985-99 in all sub-
regions, including North Africa. This means that the 
region is even losing ground in those manufacturing 
sectors where is supposed to have a competitive edge. 
How does Nigeria’s MVA and export structure 
compare to that of other countries in the region? 
Table 4 shows the degree of technological 
sophistication in MVA at the country level. South 
Africa, as expected, has the most sophisticated MVA 
structure in the region, followed by Egypt. Nigeria’s 
MVA structure appears to be quite sophisticated, 
though this should be read carefully. As shown 
earlier, and unlike other Sub-Saharan countries, total MVA in Nigeria declined by 2.4% 
between 1985 and 
1999. This puts less 





do not always reflect 
how internationally 
competitive industry 
is, because both 
industrial output and 
structure can be 
distorted by pervasive 
protectionist industrial regimes with strong orientation to domestic markets. One needs 
to explore whether production structures match export structures.  
Although MT and LT exports have slightly risen in Nigeria between 1985 and 2000, 
total manufactured exports have 
plummeted in the last 15 years. The 
RB sector has been badly damaged 
with exports  declining from 
US$185 million in 1985 to only 
US$13 million in 2000 (figure 3). 
For instance, Nigeria’s food and 
agro-forest sector declined in 
export markets by 17.3% only in 4 
years (between 1996 and 2000). 
HT exports also declined to the 
extent that the sector is almost non-
existent in world markets today. As 
a result of this, Nigeria’s export 
Table 4. Technological structure of MVA for Nigeria and Selected African 
Comparators (%) 
  1985  1998 
  MHT  LT  RB  MHT  LT  RB 
Nigeria  34.0%  23.3%  42.6%  37.7%  33.7%  28.5% 
Ghana  11.8%  8.9%  79.3%  16.8%  10.8%  72.5% 
Senegal  21.0%  21.2%  57.8%  33.6%  9.7%  56.8% 
Kenya  28.3%  17.2%  54.5%  23.6%  16.8%  59.6% 
South Africa  43.5%  17.5%  39.0%  44.4%  18.0%  37.7% 
Zimbabwe  34.3%  25.0%  40.7%  27.3%  22.3%  50.4% 
Algeria  32.4%  31.3%  36.3%  29.1%  15.3%  55.7% 
Egypt  31.1%  22.9%  46.1%  38.8%  16.4%  44.8% 
Morocco  25.2%  25.4%  49.4%  25.4%  22.7%  51.9% 
Sub-Saharan Africa  35.4%  21.6%  43.1%  37.8%  20.8%  41.3% 
Source: Calculated from UNIDO (2002) 
Notes: MHT stands for ‘medium and high technology’, LT for ‘low technology’ and RB for 
‘resource based’. ’ 
Figure 3. Evolution of Manufactured Exports in Nigeria 
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the developing world (%)
0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%
Sub-Sarahan Africa







1998QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS101  Page 10 
structure has dramatically shifted in the past 15 years (table 5). The share of HT 
products in total manufactured exports have declined from 2.6% in 1985 to only 0.5% 
in 2000. The RB sector has however suffered the most: from accounting by nearly 86% 
in total manufactured exports in 1985 it fell to less than 15% in 2000. The beneficiaries 
have been LT and MT sectors, though share increases should be interpreted cautiously 
as export volumes have dramatically dropped.  
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Nigeria is well below most African countries in m anufactured exports by each 
technological category.  
For a country such as Nigeria it is important not only to increase the contribution of 
manufacturing in the economy but also to upgrade within existing industries. These are 
the two main messages of the  conceptual sections of this paper. The figure below 
provides visual insights on this and compares Nigeria’s manufactured export 
performance to that of other countries in the region. The desirable path would be to raise 
the share of manufactures in total exports (moving right along the X axis) while shifting 
the export structure towards complex sectors (upwards along the Y axis). 
Morocco, Ghana and South Africa have done both. South Africa has the most complex 
export structure in the region. Its competitive advantage lies in technology-intensive 
Table 5. Technological structure of manufactured exports for Nigeria and Selected African 
Comparators (%) 
 
  1985  2000 
  HT  MT  LT  RB  HT  MT  LT  RB 
Nigeria  2.6%  3.0%  8.6%  85.8%  0.5%  60.3%  24.4%  14.8% 
Ghana  0.8%  2.0%  0.8%  96.4%  1.0%  5.5%  12.7%  80.8% 
Senegal  2.0%  10.9%  10.3%  76.8%  2.1%  18.7%  8.6%  70.7% 
Kenya  2.0%  6.8%  12.1%  79.0%  5.5%  9.5%  27.6%  57.5% 
South Africa  9.0%  21.2%  16.5%  53.4%  6.1%  33.8%  16.6%  43.4% 
Zimbabwe  1.5%  48.1%  23.4%  27.0%  1.7%  28.4%  31.0%  38.9% 
Algeria  0.1%  1.2%  0.2%  98.5%  0.6%  2.9%  1.3%  95.1% 
Egypt  1.1%  1.7%  35.2%  62.0%  2.4%  10.9%  31.9%  54.8% 
Morocco  0.7%  15.4%  28.7%  55.2%  11.7%  14.8%  43.3%  30.2% 
Source: Calculated from the UN Comtrade database 
Notes: HT stands for ‘high tech’, MT for ‘medium tech’, LT for ‘low tech’ and RB for ‘resource based’.  
Figure 4. Changes in the share of manufactured exports in total exports and in the 
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sector, notably as a world class supplier of parts and accessories of motorised and 
passenger vehicles, and in process engineering industries as a main producer of steel 
and iron in primary forms. Morocco, together w ith other Mediterranean countries 
including Egypt, Turkey and Tunisia, has experienced an outstanding upgrading from 
resource-based to low-tech industries mainly driven by foreign investment. Zimbabwe 
has gone backwards due to recent political woes: its share of manufactured exports in 
total exports has declined and so has its share of complex sectors in total manufacturing.  
Uganda and Nigeria show similar negative patterns, though the case of the latter is more 
acute. Nigeria lags behind other African countries in manufacturing performance: 
between 1996 and 2000 its dependency to oil exports has increased while manufactured 
exports have sharply fallen. Though its export structure appears to be highly 
sophisticated, this is more the result of falling manufactured exports rather than 
promising signs of industrial dynamism in technology-intensive sectors. Next sections 
explore Nigeria’s export performance in selected industrial sectors. 
VI. Sectoral Performance 
Resource-based Industries 
Resource-based industries include food, agro-processed products (e.g. wood 
manufactures), refined petroleum and rubber products, ore and metal concentrates, 
cement, cut gems, glass and the like. These industries tend to grow slower than other 
manufacturing industries in world trade – they grew at only 5.1 per cent per annum 
between 1990 and 2000 but lost ground in world trade as their share fell from 17 
percent in 1990 to 15.1 percent in 2000.  
These industries play a vital role in development of countries with rich resources: they 
can act as a catalyst for the transformation of agrarian economies and constitute the 
entry point to simple manufacturing activities.  
Nigeria’s resource-based industries have underperformed in recent times: exports 
declined from US$46 
million in 1996  to 
US$13 million in 
2000. As a result, 
Nigeria’s world 
market share in 
resource-based 
products has dropped 
to become one of the 
lowest in the region 
(figure 5). If we take 
the country size into 
account, the situation 
is even gloomier: 
despite having abundant natural resources, Nigeria exports less resource-based products 
than most countries in the world. But the prospects are not much brighter for the region. 
Most Sub-Saharan countries have felt strong international pressures in the industry and 
have not kept the competitive pace of other developing countries. Thus, countries such 
as Uganda, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Ghana have experienced a significant erosion of their 
market shares in resource-based industries between 1996 and 2000. By contrast, 
Senegal, Egypt and Morocco have been able to sustain or even increase their shares due 
Figure 5. World market share of resource based products for the 
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to the good performance of food-processing industries in Senegal, and of processed 
petroleum industries in Egypt and Morocco (UN Comtrade). 
  Oil 
Oil extraction is vital for the economy of many developing countries, not just in the 
Middle East but also in Latin America, Asia and Africa. Between 1990 and 2000, crude 
and refined petroleum exports grew by more than 7 per cent, which is higher than the 
average for primary exports and even manufactured exports. The world market share for 
crude and refined petroleum exports increased from 7.9 per cent in 1990 to 8.3 per cent 
in 2000, making the sector not just one of the most dynamic but also one of the largest 
in world exports. Yet, high dependency to it is considered inappropriate for sustainable 
economic growth as the sector is often badly affected by changing world prices. 
First discovered in 1956, petroleum has become vital to the Nigerian economy and is 
today the most important source of g overnment revenue and foreign exchange. 
Increased world oil prices in the mid-1970s produced rapid economic growth in Nigeria, 
but constant world price fluctuations since then have contributed to economic 
deceleration, with a feeble manufacturing sector not being able to reverse the trend. 
Within the oil value chain, refined and processed products have higher value added and 
so bring more economic benefits than crude petroleum. They also embody a higher 
degree of technological sophistication and require more specialised skills. Figure 6 
shows some oil-exporting economies in their attempt to either reduce their oil export 
dependency or maximise value added within the oil value chain. 
Figure 6. Changes in the share of petroleum exports in total exports and in the share of 
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Nigeria’s total oil exports are relatively large 
compared to other oil-exporting countries – it 
accounts for more than 12 per cent of world 
market share for oil. Nigeria has become 
increasingly dependent on the oil sector as 
petroleum exports account for more than 99 per 
cent of total exports (the bubble for Nigeria for 
1996 is  behind the one for 2000). However, 
Nigeria has not capitalised on its oil potential 
as its refined and processed oil exports have 
been wiped out from international markets  – 
exports in higher stages of the oil value chain 
have declined from US$ 21 million in 1996 to 
nil in 2000. Nigeria lacks the oil refineries that 
can produce the low sulphur light products 
required by export markets. This has made 
Nigeria become the biggest net importer of 
refined petroleum products among all oil-
exporting countries (figure 7).  For a country 
that exports nearly US$40 billion in crude, this 
is rather distressing and really calls for imminent policy action. 
Other oil-exporting countries are facing similar challenges, but have been able to 
diversify into non-oil industries or move up in the value chain (figure 6). Nigeria should 
learn from these successful stories. For instance, Indonesia exports US$ 8.2 billion in 
crude and refined oil products but has reduced its dependency on oil due to the 
expansion of manufactured exports. It is also high up in the oil value chain as refined 
and processed oil products account for almost 30 per cent of total oil exports. Oman and 
Algeria have slightly moved up in the value chain, though Oman has become a bit more 
dependent on oil exports b etween 1996 and 2000. Like Nigeria, Kuwait is highly 
dependent on oil: revenues from crude and oil-related exports accounted for nearly 86 
per cent of total exports in 2000. However, in the last decade, Kuwait has managed to 
reduce this dependency by diversifying into resource-based manufactures while moving 
into higher value activities within the oil chain. As shown in the figure, almost 50 per 
cent of Kuwait’s oil exports in 2000 come from refined or processed products. Together 
with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait has among the most advanced and efficient oil refineries in 
the world. Although crude exports have been declining since the early 1990s, this has 
not affected the economy as export diversification and technological upgrading have 
raised Kuwait’s competitive potential. The Latin America oil exporters – i.e. Ecuador 
and Venezuela – have not been able to diversify due to increased oil exports and a 
shrinking manufacturing sector while have also experienced a downgrading within the 
oil value chain – a significant share of their crude is now being processed by Mexican 
refineries to serve the US market.  
Food 
Nigeria’s food industry has traditionally served the domestic needs of a fast growing 
population. Food exports only accounted for US$ 4.5 million in 2000, one of the lowest 
in Africa if taking into consideration country size. Sugar and honey, butter, wheat meats 
and flour and fixed vegetable oil represent more than 90 per cent of Nigeria’s food 
exports. Among these, sugar and honey and butter have grown at a annual rate of more 
Figure 7. Trade balance for  refined 
petroleum products 
(SITC 334,335) (US$ million, 2000)
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than 80 per cent between 1996 and 2000 (figure 8). The figures are however so small 
that the gains in world market share are minuscule (less than 0.1 per cent in 4 years). 
Fixed vegetable oil, by contrary, is facing declining growth trends as exports have 
plummeted from US$3.2 million in 1996 to US$1.6 million in 2000.  Most food exports 
in Nigeria are experiencing similar failing trends in world markets. In fact, the situation 
has deteriorated to the extent that none of Nigeria’s food exports (excluding the four 
sub-sectors above) sell more than US$0.1 million in world markets. This is very 
disturbing for a country with a relatively strong agricultural sector. 
One of the many factors explaining the weak performance of the food industry in 
Nigeria is the disconnection between the agricultural sector and the domestic food 
industry. Nigeria has a solid agricultural sector  for export markets based on three major 
products: fish and shell fish (fresh and frozen), cocoa, and vegetable oils. These 
products put together accounted for half of Nigeria’s manufactured exports in 2000. 
However, they have not been used as inputs for the food industry, which would have 
increased their value added in world markets. Take for instance the case of vegetable 
seeds. Nigeria exported nearly US$30 million of seeds for vegetable oil in 2000 (soft 
and others), while it only exported US$1.1 million of vegetable oil. The potential 
benefits of the vegetable oil industry are still far from being realised. This would require 
building up the capabilities of domestic oil processing companies while establishing the 
appropriate mechanisms to link up agricultural output with the food industry.  
 
Low-tech Industries 
Low-tech industries include the textile and fashion cluster, pottery, simple metal parts 
and structures, furniture, jewellery, toys, plastic products and the like. On average, these 
products have had a slightly higher growth rate (5.3 per cent per annum) than resource-
based industries over the 1990s, though this is  lower than the average for 
manufacturing. In global terms, low-tech industries accounted in 2000 for 15 per cent of 
world trade, declining from 16.6 per cent in 1990.  
Low-tech industries are the main manufacturing activity in the developing world. Low-
tech products tend to have stable, well-diffused technologies embodied in capital 
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equipment. They have low R&D expenditures and labour costs and skill requirements 
are simple and easy to meet. As a consequence of low barriers to entry, competition in 
particular segments of low-tech industries is fierce.  
Between 1996 and 2000, Nigeria’s low-tech exports declined from already low US$ 58 
million to US$ 21 million. This represents an annual decrease of 22 per cent for the four 
year period. Nigeria’s 
reputation as a 
competitive low-tech 
exporter within the region 
does not hold true 
anymore. Today 
neighbouring Senegal and 
Ghana export more low-
tech products than 
Nigeria, despite the size 
difference. As a 
consequence of its poor 
export performance and 
increased competitive 
pressures from other developing  countries, Nigeria’s world market share in low-tech 
products has significantly declined (figure 9). Other Sub-Saharan countries, including 
Kenya, Zimbabwe and Egypt are also facing similar trends, though their export levels 
are higher than that of Nigeria.  
 
Textile/Clothing 
The textile and clothing industry has seen massive relocation from developed to 
developing areas in the last two decades. The simpler assembly operations have shifted 
to low wage sites while complex design and manufacturing functions have been 
retained in the advanced countries. This relocation has been the engine of export growth 
for many poor countries, but not for Nigeria. Indeed, Nigeria’s clothing and textile 
Figure 9. World market share of low- tech products for the Nigeria and 


































































































Figure 10. Change in the world market share and annual growth rate of Nigeria´s four major 








































Bubble size indicates value of exports in 2000 (US$ million)   
SITC 652. Cotton fabrics, woven (1,4)
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industry has suffered increased c ompetitive pressures from other African countries 
(mainly Mauritius, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco) but primarily from South Asia and 
China. Only between 1996 and 2000, Nigeria’s textile and clothing exports plummeted 
from US$41.5 million to US$8.2 million: this represent an annual drop of 32 per cent in 
four years. Take now Nigeria’s main clothing and textile exports in 2000 (figure 10).  
The leather industry has experienced positive growth trends in world markets between 
1996 and 2000, with exports increasing from US$1.9 to US$2.4 million. This is 
however the exception rather than the rule: other textile and clothing sub-sectors in 
Nigeria have faced declining exports in world markets. Take for instance textile yarn 
where exports sharply fell from US$19 million in 1996 to US$1.4 million in 2000.  
Nigeria has not been able to keep up with the fast pace of other yarn producing 
countries in and outside the region (e.g Egypt, Turkey, China), which have benefited 
from improved quality and location advantages as well as increased production of raw 
cotton. Nigeria’s cotton yarn sector has been restricted in export markets due to its low 
quality and declining cotton production. Cotton fabrics have faced similar constrains as 
exports declined by more than US$7 million between 1996 and 2000.  
Other African countries have coped with increased competition by specialising in fast 
growing sub-sectors. Take the three fastest growing textile and clothing products in the 
world: knitted or crocheted fabrics, made-up articles, and outer garments (figure 11). 
Egypt has found its niche in the knitted fabrics industry as it currently owes nearly 0.7 
per cent of the world market. Morocco has done so in made-up articles and Zimbabwe 
in outer garments. Kenya, with a somehow smaller presence in world markets, has been 
able to retain market shares in highly competitive sub-sectors. Nigeria’s textile and 
clothing industry, by contrast, has been almost wiped out from the international scene.  
Medium-tech Industries 
Medium-tech industries are the heartland of industrial activity in mature economies, 
comprising the bulk of skill and scale-intensive technologies in capital goods and 
intermediates. Medium-tech industries comprise automotive products such as passenger 
vehicles, motorcycles and parts, process products such as synthetic fibres, chemicals 
Figure 11. 2000 world market shares in fastest growing clothing/textile exports for Nigeria and 
selected African comparators (2000)
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and paints, fertilizers and plastics, and engineering products such as engines, motors 
and industrial machinery.  
Medium-tech industries generally are capital-intensive, use complex technologies, have 
high levels of R&D spending and need advanced technical skills. Most require lengthy 
learning periods to master technologies. Barriers to entry in these industries tend to be 
high particularly where there are large capital needs, strong demand for technical skills, 
and long learning periods in design and product development. Barriers to entry are 
lower in the most labour-intensive processes of medium-tech industries (e.g. assembly 
in the automobile industry). Only a few developing countries, mainly in East Asia and 
Latin America, have benefited from the relocation of assembly operations to low wage 
areas.   
Medium-tech exports grew at 5.4 per cent per annum between 1990 and 2000, but they 
continue to account for the bulk of world trade (31.4 per cent). They lost ground to 
high-tech exports in the last decade; indeed, high-tech products grew at 11.1 per cent 
per annum between 1990 and 2000, rapidly raising their market share to 24.2 per cent. 
Should the trend continue, high-tech products will soon be the largest component of 
world trade.  
Nigeria’s medium-tech 
industries are far from 
being competitive 
internationally, but have 
coped with global pressures 
better than expected (figure 
12). Medium-tech exports 
declined by only US$3 
million between 1996 and 
2000 (from $55 million to 
$52 million). This 1 per 
cent drop can be seen with a 
certain degree of optimism 
if we bear in mind that total 
manufactured exports in Nigeria declined by 14 per cent in only four years. And yet, as 
in many other economies in Sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria’s world market share in 
medium-tech industries is dismal. 
Engineering 
The engineering sector accounts for almost 69 per cent of Nigeria’s medium-tech 
industry. Moreover, this sector is the only manufacturing industry in Nigeria where 
exports have increased: from US$34 million in 1996 to US$36 million in 2000. 
According to many, some of Nigeria’s engineering sub-sectors are  relatively 
sophisticated for African standards and are starting to be more competitive in regional 
markets. Empirical evidence however shows that export volumes of engineering 
products in Nigeria are still very low when taking into consideration the country size. 
All in all, three sub-sectors account for the bulk of Nigeria’s engineering exports: ships 
and boats, pumps and civil engineering equipment (figure 13) .  Take for instance the 
ship and boats industry, which is Nigeria’s most important manufactured export. 
Between 1996 and 2000, the industry has faced strong competition and exports have 
declined from US$31 million to US$ 25.4 million, hence losing a significant share in 
world markets. Yet, Nigeria’s ship and boats exports are one of the highest in Africa, 
accounting for more than half of those of South Africa in 2000. Civil engineering 
Figure 12. World market share of medium- tech products for the Nigeria 
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equipment is another interesting sub-sector showing dynamic growth: exports have 
increased by US$6.5 million between 1996 and 2000, though this is still very low to 
have a significant presence on world markets. Other products such us mechanical 
handling equipment, metalworking machinery, and medical instruments are also 
showing interesting growth patterns, though export figures are still relatively small to be 
considered as emerging sectors. Only time will tell.  
VII. Industrial Capabilities 
What explain Nigeria’s weak performance? We now consider some structural factors 
for industrial competitiveness in Nigeria: human capital, technological effort, FDI, 
technology import and information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure.  
Human Capital 
The importance of human capita is a vital element for industrial competitiveness. With 
the pace of technical change, the spread of information technologies and intensifying 
global competitiveness, the need for skill development has become even more 
commanding. More importantly, the patterns of skills needed for competing in the ‘new 
economy’ have changed as well as the institutional structures around them. Thus, while 
general industrial development in the past required simply improving general levels of 
education, the emerging competitive setting calls for greater emphasis on high-level, 
specialised training, with the private sector extending the learning process in the 
company.  
These dimensions cannot, however, be captured with quantitative data, at least on a 
national basis. Enrolment data is not an ideal measure of the skill base for industrial 
activity. It does not take into account the quality, completion and relevance of formal 
education and it ignores important forms of skill formation such as on-the-job training. 
However, it is the only data available and does capture the base of education on which 
other skills are grafted. As technical skills have become more demanding, we shall 
concentrate on enrolments at the tertiary level, and particularly in technical subjects: 
science, mathematics and computing, and engineering. 
Figure 13. Change in the world market share and annual growth rate of Nigeria´s three major 
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Sub-Saharan Africa, with the lowest enrolment rates in secondary and tertiary education 
in the developing world (annex table 7). Moreover, the education gap between Sub-
Saharan Africa and other developing regions has widened for the period 1985-1997. For 
instance, while enrolments in secondary education in South Asia, East Asia and Latin 
America have increased by 17, 13 and 10 percentage points respectively, enrolments in 
Sub-Saharan Africa have only increased by 7. S imilar trends are seen in tertiary 
education, with Sub-Saharan Africa only enrolling 3 per cent of people in the age group 
compared to 25 and 22 per cent in East Asia and Latin America.  
Where does Nigeria’s human base stand within the region? Take general enrolment 
levels (table 6). In secondary education, Nigeria enrolled more people (as % of relevant 
group) than Senegal and Kenya in 
1997, though much less than 
most Southern and Northern 
African countries. In 1997, 
Nigeria’s enrolment levels in 
tertiary education were higher 
than those of Ghana, Senegal and 
Kenya, but again far from those 
of South Africa, Algeria, Egypt 
and Morocco. Nigeria has 
however seen little improvement 
in enrolment levels between 1985 
and 1997. This stagnating trend, 
particularly in secondary 
education, is rather worrying for 
future competitiveness. 
Intra-regional differences are 
even more acute in tertiary technical enrolment (annex figure 1). In 1997 North Africa 
alone had twice the number of students enrolled in high-level, technical subjects than 
the rest of Africa, including South Africa. With the exception of Central Africa, most 
Sub-Saharan regions have experienced positive growth rates in the number of students 
enrolled in technical subjects between 1985 and 1997. However, one should not be 
overoptimistic with such findings given the small educational base of Sub-Saharan 
countries: the number of students enrolled in technical subjects in Sub-Saharan Africa 
account for only 2.8 per cent within the developing world. 
Table 6. Enrolments in secondary and tertiary education for Nigeria 
and selected African comparators 
 (% of relevant group) 
  Secondary  Tertiary 
  1985  1997  1985  1997 
Nigeria  33  33  3  4 
Ghana  40  n.a  1  1 
Senegal  14  16  2  3 
Kenya  21  24  1  2 
South Africa  n.a  95  n.a  17 
Zimbabwe  41  50  4  7 
Algeria  51  63  8  13 
Egypt  61  78  18  23 
Morocco  35  39  9  11 
Source: World Bank, WDI2002 
N.a: data not available QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS101  Page 20 
Given previous education figures, Nigeria’s enrolment l evels in technical subjects is 
quite impressive. Nigeria enrolled 63 thousand students in technical subjects in 1997, 
which accounted for almost 1 per cent of tertiary technical enrolment in the developing 
world. Nigeria has experienced an annual growth rate of 13.2 per cent in tertiary 
technical enrolment between 1985 and 1997. This is above the average for the 
developing world 
and  for most 
African countries 
(except Zimbabwe 
and Algeria).  These 
figures suggest that 
Nigeria has a 
structural strength in 
technical skill 
formation which 
may be used to boost 
its competitive 




does not pay off if 
basic education is still lacking, which appears to be the case of Nigeria. This is an 
important precondition to strengthen Nigeria’s huge body of technical manpower, which 
may enjoy concomitant advantages of critical mass, externalities and agglomeration 
benefits. 
Technology Effort 
There is no doubt that the intensity and effectiveness of technological activity 
performed by enterprises determine a country’s competitive performance in 
manufacturing. Technological effort in developing countries consists less of formal 
R&D than of diffuse engineering and technical work for absorption, adaptation, learning 
and improvement of existing technologies. Technological effort is very difficult to 
measure as it takes many forms, and occurs in many facets of manufacturing activity. 
R&D focus on the tip of the technological activity iceberg – but it is still important for 
developing countries to assimilate, adapt and improve imported technologies. Indeed, a 
strong R&D base permits a better and faster diffusion of technologies, facilitates greater 
and more efficient use of local resources, and makes indigenous firms more attractive to 
TNCs. 
National R&D data can be misleading, as it may contain many elements not relevant to 
industry (e.g. R&D performed in research institutions, universities or even military 
centres). R&D expenditure in productive enterprises is, perhaps, the best indicator of 
‘technologically useful’ R&D. Although it is a rough indicator of technology effort, it 
provides a first insight on the intensity of technological activity, and data can be 
obtained for many countries, including in Africa.  
R&D expending is highly concentrated in rich countries; around 95 per cent of the 
world R&D financed by productive enterprises is performed in industrialised countries 
(UNIDO, 2002). Within the developing world the concentration is also remarkable: East 
Asia alone accounts for almost 78 per cent of the R&D spent in the developing world; 
Latin America follows with 15.4 per cent and next is Sub-Saharan Africa with 2.8 per 
Table 7. Tertiary Technical Enrolment in Nigeria and selected African countries   
(total numbers, distribution and growth rates) 
  1985  1997   











Nigeria  23.5  0.5%  63.3  0.9%  13.2% 
Ghana   1.9  0.0%  2.1  0.0%  1.3% 
Senegal  3.3  0.1%  4.4  0.1%  3.7% 
Kenya  5.5  0.1%  4.6  0.1%  -2.2% 
South Africa  68.9  1.4%  68.1  1.0%  -0.1% 
Zimbabwe  0.9  0.0%  9.5  0.1%  34.3% 
Algeria  29.8  0.6%  115.1  1.7%  18.4% 
Egypt  75  1.6%  69.6  1.0%  -0.9% 
Morocco  56.8  1.2%  66.7  1.0%  2.0% 
Source: UNESCO, various issues 
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cent. This latter figure is distorted by South Africa, which on its own accounts for 99 
per cent of R&D expenditure in the region (annex table 8). Excluding this country, 
R&D expenditure in Sub-Saharan Africa is than US$ 1 million: this is almost 30 times 
less than North Africa’s spending in R&D. On a per capita basis, Sub-Saharan Africa, 
excluding South Africa, i s practically absent in R&D spending. The private sector in 
North Africa, on the contrary, shows interesting signs of technology effort, though its 
R&D figures are still far from those of most East Asian and Latin American countries.  
Table 8 shows enterprise productive R&D 
spending for Nigeria and other African countries. 
As expected, South Africa leads R&D spending 
in the region with almost US$ 0.5 billion in 1995 
(US$ 1 1.90 in 1995). This puts it ahead of 
transition economies such as Hungary (US$ 
11.3), Poland (US$ 8.3), the Russian Federation 
(US$ 7.5), and fast-growing developing countries 
such as Malaysia (US$ 6.7), and Costa Rica 
(US$5.5) (UNIDO ,2002). Nigeria, as w ell as 
Kenya and Zimbabwe, appear to be performing 
some R&D, become it becomes insignificant 




World trade in manufacturing is increasingly related to MNC activity. The new global 
setting has opened up  new alternatives for firms in developing countries to tap into 
export markets and use FDI as a means to access advanced technologies and know-how. 
The importance of attracting FDI has risen with faster technical change, trade 
liberalisation and the internationalisation of production. Internalised technology transfer 
refers to the transfer of technology within the firm, that is, from parents to affiliates of 
MNC, as distinguished from arm’s length or externalised transfers between firms.   
Today, MNCs account for large shares of world trade, particularly in technologically 
advanced industries, suggesting that entry into a large and most dynamic MNCa are 
seeking to decentralise labour-intensive stages in the production process to countries 
with cheap and abundant labour, while keeping the innovation and research sites in their 
home countries. This international division of labour brings potential benefits to 
companies in developing countries, as their changes to compete internationally on their 
own are remote. However, attracting FDI and getting integrated into global value chains 
do not necessarily mean the neglect of skill upgrading and domestic technological 
capability in firms. While FDI can be used for firms in developing countries to stimulate 
industrial a ctivity and to start accumulating capital and skills, building indigenous 
technological capabilities is a must in order to move up in the technology ladder and to 
generate more profitable and sustainable industrial rents.  
Inward FDI data have important caveats to bear in mind. First, it does not distinguish 
between investment in manufacturing from that in other activities, therefore not fully 
capturing industrial technology transfer per se. Second, it does not distinguish between 
export-oriented FDI from that aimed at domestic markets. While such fine distinctions 
cannot be explored with the FDI data on its own, one can, however, look at 
complementary data, (e.g. exports) and other sources to distinguish whether countries 
Table 8. Enterprise productive R&D in Nigeria 
and selected African countries 




Nigeria  0.4  0.00 
Ghana   0.0  0.00 
Senegal  0.0  0.00 
Kenya  0.1  0.00 
South Africa  499.6  11.90 
Zimbabwe  0.1  0.00 
Algeria  4.8  0.16 
Egypt  17.8  0.28 
Morocco  3.5  0.12 
Sources: Calculated from UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook 
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are really ‘plugged into’ integrated value chains, and whether technology transfer is 
likely to be occurring.      
In the last decade, the amount of FDI received by Sub-Saharan Africa increased from 
US$ 2 billion in 1990 to more than US$ 7 billion in 1999 (UNCTAD, World Investment 
Report 2000). This 15 per cent annual growth rate in the 1990s was, however, below the 
performance of the other developing regions in attracting foreign investment. FDI in 
South Asia grew at 22 per cent, in East Asia at 19 per cent and in Latin America at 
nearly 30 per cent. This explains why Sub-Saharan Africa’s FDI share within the 
developing world went down from 6.9 per cent in 1990 to 3.5 per cent in 1999 (see 
annex figure 2). Excluding South Africa, the share goes down to only 2.9 per cent. As 
R&D spending, FDI is highly concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa: only South Africa 
and Nigeria accounted for 38 per cent of all FDI in the region in 1999. North Africa on 
its own attracts more FDI than West, East and Central Africa altogether.  
Inward FDI flows in Nigeria have grown from US$317 million in the period between 
1982 and 1997 to a high US$1,400 million in 1999 (table 9). This represents an annual 
growth rate of 10 per cent for the period, though between 1995 and 1999 FDI inflows 
significantly slowed down. In 1999, Nigeria attracted more FDI than South Africa and 
only US$100 million less than Egypt. Within West Africa, Nigeria is by far the main 
destination for FDI. However it is important to note that most FDI inflows in Nigeria go 
into oil-related and other resource-based activities rather than manufacturing. In fact, 
MNC presence in Nigeria is mainly restricted to the petroleum extraction industry (e.g. 
Shell, Chevron Texaco Corp., Canadian 
Occidental Petroleum Ltd., Agip, Total 
Fina Elf, etc.) and the food industry (e.g. 
Nestle, Coca Cola, Danone, Novartis, 
etc.) Although the government benefits 
from joint ventures  – the largest joint 
venture is operated by Shell Nigeria and 
produces nearly 50 per cent of Nigeria’s 
crude oil  – Nigeria lacks the 
manufacturing investments required to 
boost the industrial small-scale sector 
through subcontracting arrangements and 
inter-firm cooperation.    
What is impeding Nigeria from attracting 
more investment in manufacturing? 
Table 9. FDI inflows in Nigeria and selected African countries (US$ millions) 













Nigeria  371  588  1,079  1,400  9.6%  12.9%  6.7%  10.0% 
Ghana   6  15  107  115  20.1%  48.1%  1.8%  23.5% 
Senegal  -1  -3  35  60  24.6%  -263.5%  14.4%  - 
Kenya  24  57  32  42  18.9%  -10.9%  7.0%  4.1% 
South Africa  44  -5  1,241  1,376  -164.7%  -401.3%  2.6%  27.9% 
Zimbabwe  -4  -12  118  59  24.6%  -258.0%  -15.9%  - 
Algeria  -7  0  5  6  -100.0%  -  4.7%  - 
Egypt  809  734  596  1,500  -1.9%  -4.1%  26.0%  4.5% 
Morocco  42  165  335  847  31.5%  15.2%  26.1%  23.9% 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1994 and 2000 
Figure 14. Risk perception (highest risk to 
lowest rating), 2000
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MNC presence in a country depends on a number of economic factors and host country 
government policies and institutions (Belderbos et al., 2001; Dicken, 1998; Dunning, 
1993, Lall, 1980). While corporate strategies and the location of MNCs are demand-side 
factors, local firms’ technological capabilities, macro-economic policies and the policy 
and regulatory environment constitutes supply-side factors. International risk and credit 
ratings can be a useful indicator of how a country is perceived by the international 
investment community. According to the World Bank’s composite risk ratings (WDI 
2002), which capture in one index the political, financial and economic risk factors 
affecting foreign investment, Nigeria has the among the highest investment risks within 
Africa (figure 14)
1. Only Zimbabwe, under Mugabe’s dictatorship, has become a riskier 
country for foreign investment in Africa. The underlying factors depicted in these 
composite indices, though quiet simplistic, may shed some light on the reasons for low 
manufacturing investment in Nigeria. Further research is however needed to explain the 
direct causes for low FDI inflows in the region and particularly in Nigeria.  
 
Technology Licensing  
Arm’s length purchases of know-how, patents, trademarks and licenses are other 
important means of technology transfer, which occur between independent firms and 
not between parent MNC and affiliates. The advantages of externalised technology 
transfer are similar to those happening within a firm, though, the process tends to be, if 
anything, richer as the partnership is often founded upon equal conditions where 
independent firms can set up their own objectives. Externalised technology transfer is 
often measured by payments abroad of technology licences and royalties. Two main 
problems arise. First, royalties and technical fees are not necessarily for industrial 
technology; they could well be to obtain franchises or brand names in the service sector. 
Second, they often include non-arm’s length transactions, that is, by affiliates to MNC 
parents. Despite all this, this indicator is the best proxy for technology purchases by 
local firms, and data are available for cross-country analysis. 
Like FDI, technology licence payments are highly concentrated within the developing 
world: East Asia and Latin America account for nearly 86 per cent of total royalty 
payments in the developing world (UNIDO, 2002). Between 1990 and 1998, technology 
licence payments in Sub-Saharan Africa went up from US$128 to US$258 million, 
though this is a slower growth rate when compared to other developing regions.  As a 
consequence, Sub-Saharan Africa’s technology licence payments share in the 
developing world declined from 7.1 per cent in 1990 to 3.2 per cent in 1998 (annex 
figure 3). Interestingly, this share has substantially gone up for North Africa, whose 
private sector today spends in technology licensing twice the total amount spent in the 
rest of the continent.  
                                                                 
1 The most well-known risk ratings are: the PRS Group’s International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which provides data on 
political, financial and economic risk, expressed as a single rating ranging from 0 to 100 (highest risk to lowest). The Institutional 
Investor Country Credit Ratings (ICCR), based on information provided by international banks, and measuring risk similarly from 0 
to 100 (highest risk to lowest). The Euromoney country creditworthiness index (ECC) assess country risk, again on a scale of 0 to 
100, from a broader range of variables including debt, economic performance, political risk and access to financial markets.   
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Statistical evidence shows that technology 
transfer through royalty payments in Nigeria is 
negligible (table 10). Low MNC presence in 
manufacturing sectors and t he country’s weak 
technological base are important explanatory 
factors for this. Again, Northern African countries 
show impressive records: Morocco and Egypt are 
first in royalty payments within the region. In per 
capita terms, these two countries spend more in 
technology licensing than Poland (US$ 5), 
Indonesia (US$ 4.9) Chile (US$ 3.8) and the 
Philippines (US$ 2.1) (UNIDO, 2002). As can be 
noted, many African countries have negligible 
figures in royalty payments (not only the country 
comparators shown here), which combined with 
low FDI, represents a major handicap to 
technology transfer and know-how, and therefore, to industrial development. 
ICT Infrastructure 
Information and communication technologies (ICTs) are at the heart of technical change 
both in industrialised and developing countries. As their potential benefits are being 
realised and their costs continue to fall, such technologies are being applied throughout 
all sectors of the economy. In the developing world, the spread of ICTs brings new 
opportunities to reduce the gap by shrinking economic distance and providing instant 
and economical access to information. They also allow enterprises to reach markets in 
new ways, inconceivable in earlier times. It is partly in response to this underlying 
economic reality that many governments in third world countries are developing 
national ICT strategies to build ‘knowledge societies’ to support their development 
objectives (Mansell and Wehn, 1998). While general traditional infrastructure remains 
as a major f actor in economic development, ICTs are growing their importance in 
industrial competitiveness, particularly in technology-intensive activities. 
This section uses telephone mainlines, personal computers, PCs and internet hosts as 
proxies of ICT infrastructure. Data are reliable and available for most countries in the 
world. East Asia and Latin America accounted in 1999 for 92, 84 and 90 per cent of all 
telephone mainlines, PCs and internet hosts within the developing world (UNIDO, 
2002). South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa are clearly lagging behind in ICTs. Within 
Africa, the distribution ICT indicators is very similar to that of other industrial 
capabilities (annex figure 4). North Africa, on its own, has nearly the same number of 
telephone mainlines than the rest of the continent, including South Africa. In terms of 
‘advanced’ ICT (PCs), only four countries in North Africa – Algeria, Morocco, Egypt 
and Tunisia – have one third of what the continent has excluding South Africa.  
Table 10. Technology licence payments in 
Nigeria and selected African countries  




Nigeria  0  0.00 
Ghana   0  0.00 
Senegal  2  0.22 
Kenya  44  1.52 
South Africa  162  3.86 
Zimbabwe  0  0.00 
Algeria  0  0.00 
Egypt  329  5.22 
Morocco  210  7.50 
Sources: Calculated from UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook 
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How is Nigeria doing in ICTs? Table 11 provides some interesting insights. In total 
terms, Nigeria has more than 60 per cent and 80 per cent of West Africa’s telephone 
mainlines and personal computers respectively. However, when taking into 
consideration country size, Nigeria lags behind neighbouring Ghana and Senegal in 
telephone mainlines (per 1000 people) and internet hosts (per 100000 people). In fact, 
Nigeria has the lowest ICT figures within the region except for personal computers per 
1000 people.   
 
VIII. Conclusions 
In a rapid changing world driven by technological progress and the increased access to 
capital flows, knowledge and goods, Nigeria’s manufacturing  sector is clearly 
underperforming. This paper shows that Nigeria is caught in a low equilibrium trap 
where weak domestic capabilities have translated into a disappointing industrial 
performance. In the last decade, Nigeria’s industrial sector has faced a d ecline in 
production and export capacity and the economy has become even more dependent on 
primary exports, notably oil. This trend puts serious questions to Nigeria’s future 
industrial competitiveness. The approach of this paper  emphasises Nigeria’s weak 
industrial capabilities in explaining its performance:  severe flaws in the education 
system, technological stagnation of domestic companies, lack of foreign investment in 
manufacturing, negligible technology transfer from TNCs and weak ICT infrastructure 
constitute significant factors for failure. Further analysis should however include other 
factors not explored in this analysis, including macro-economic and fiscal policies, 
governance and the regulatory and business environment.  
Nigeria is calling for  a ‘vision’ on industrial strategy. Important questions that the 
government faces include: which factors are hampering industrial development today? 
What can be done to revitalise existing industries? In which industrial sectors might 
Nigeria have a competitive edge in the future? What domestic capabilities should be 
strengthen or created and through which policies? Rather than answering these 
questions, this paper has provided a comprehensive picture of where Nigeria’s industry 
stands in the international s cene and what factors may explain its disappointing 
performance. 
However, Nigeria has important strengths that need to be taken into account. It has the 
biggest domestic market in the region and is rich in natural resources, particularly oil. It 





























Nigeria  496.0  61.2%  4  793.6  81.2%  6.4  0.1  17.8%  0.01 
Ghana   152.0  18.8%  8  47.5  4.9%  2.5  0.1  16.4%  0.06 
Senegal  162.0  20.0%  18  135.9  13.9%  15.1  0.5  65.9%  0.51 
Kenya  290.0  29.7%  10  121.8  28.9%  4.2  0.9  18.6%  0.32 
South Africa  5,250.0  92.0%  125  2,297.4  89.1%  54.7  181.1  97.8%  43.12 
Zimbabwe  252.0  4.4%  21  156.0  6.0%  13  3.1  1.7%  2.61 
Algeria  1,560.0  18.2%  52  174.0  12.7%  5.8  0.0  0.5%  0.01 
Egypt  4,725.0  55.1%  75  756.0  55.2%  12  5.4  83.7%  0.85 
Morocco  1,484.0  17.3%  53  302.4  22.1%  10.8  0.9  14.4%  0.33 
Source: World Bank, WDI2001 
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also counts with an abundant and cheap labour force and an increased number of 
students enrolled in technical subjects. These are important ingredients to compete in 
resource-based and low-tech manufacturing sectors. There is evidence that there are a 
growing number  of private small scale firms that serve local markets with simple 
technologies and that have a reservoir of artisanal skills. There is immense untapped 
opportunities here if their skill base and technology could be strengthened, and if they 
could be linked to large domestic enterprises or MNCs as suppliers or subcontractors. 
However, FDI inflows into Nigeria have not gone into the manufacturing sector, 
depicting that a cheap and abundant labour has not been enough to attract 
manufacturing MNCs.  
Nigeria f aces greater weaknesses in its industrial capabilities and policies that need to 
be addressed by the government. At the highest level are macroeconomic imbalances, 
severe flaws in the business environment, and a poor governance record. This has 
resulted in Nigeria being considered a high risk country by the international investment 
community. Unconditional government support to oil extraction (as the main means for 
the government to earn foreign exchange) has somehow meant the neglect of 
manufacturing activity. The result is an economy highly dependent on the primary 
sector, with an uncompetitive and isolated industrial sector completely unaware of 
global trends and technological progress. As shown in the industrial assessment, 
Nigeria’s industry remains at  low levels of value and quality, mainly serves the 
domestic market and is badly position in terms of market growth. On the capability side, 
the stagnation of school enrolments in secondary and tertiary education is a serious 
concern for Nigeria’s competitive future, and so is its low levels of technology transfer 
through royalty payments, R&D spending, and ICT development. 
Bilateral and multilateral trade agreements will allow Nigeria’s industrial sector to 
access new and more demanding markets within and outside the region. The potential 
benefits of opening up to global markets can become  threats however. Experience 
shows that sweeping liberalisation can have ruinous consequences when: a) capabilities 
have not been built up to face the new challenges; b) the pace of liberalisation is too fast 
that firms and institutions cannot adjust to the changing environment; and c) there is not 
efficient of supply-driven initiatives to help firms cope with increased competitive 
pressures. The costs of liberalisation could be huge for Nigeria’s industrial sector if 
these strategic elements are not tackled by the government. For some years, Nigeria will 
remain being dependent on oil revenues. How fast can the country undertake an 
industrial reform to diversify away from oil and benefit from a robust industrial sector is 
indeed a key issue for its future competitiveness. Delays on this front constitute a real 
threat for Nigeria’s industrial sector as competition from other developing countries is 
increasing. A major constrain for industrial upgrading is remaining marginalized from 
international flows of capital, technology and know-how. These should be key policy 
areas to be addressed by the government if industrial performance is to be enhanced in 
the near future. 




Albaladejo, M.,  (2002). ‘Promoting SMEs in Africa: Key Areas for Policy 
Intervention’, background report for UNIDO-AfDB joint project to update the African 
Development Bank’s new Policy Guidelines to Promote Small and Medium Scale 
Enterprises, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire.  
Albaladejo, M. and Schmitz, H., (2001). ‘Enhancing the Competitiveness of SMEs in 
Africa: A Strategic Framework for Support Services’. ECA: Paper prepared for the 
Development Management Division, Addis Ababa.   
Belderbos, R., Capannelli, G. and  Fukao, K. (2001), ‘Backward Vertical Linkages of 
Foreign Manufacturing Affiliates: Evidence from Japanese Multinationals’,  World 
Development, 29, pp. 189-208. 
Dicken, P., (1998), Global Shift. Transforming the World Economy, Paul Chapman 
Publishing, London. 
Dunning, J., (1993). Multinational enterprises and the global economy, Addison-
Wesley Publishing Company, Wokingham, UK. 
Mansell, R. and Wehn, U., (1998). Knowledge Societies: Information Technology for 
Sustainable Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press for the United Nations 
Commission on Science and Technology. 
Lall, S., (2001). Competitiveness, Technology and Skills, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Lall, S., (1980), ‘Vertical inter-firm linkages in LDC: An empirical study’, Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 42, pp. 203-226. 
UNCTAD, (2001). Handbook of Statistics 2002. Geneva.  
UNCTAD,  (2000). World Investment Report, 2000. Geneva. 
UNCTAD, (1994). World Investment Report, 1994. Geneva. 
UNESCO (1997). Statistical Yearbook. Paris. 
UNESCO (1994). Statistical Yearbook. Paris. 
UNESCO (1990). Statistical Yearbook. Paris. 
UNIDO,  (2002). Industrial Development Report 2002/2003: Competing through 
Learning and Innovation. Vienna. 
UNIDO,  (1999). Supporting Private Industry. Private Sector Development Branch, 
Investment Promotion and Institutional Capacity Building Division. Vienna. 
UNIDO, (1996). Industrial Development Global Report. Vienna. 
World Bank, (2002). World Development Indicators 2002. Washington, DC. 
World Bank, (2001). Governance Indicators. Washington, DC. 
 QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS101  Page 28 
Statistical Annex 
 
Annex table 1. Manufacturing Value Added for Sub-Saharan Africa and other Developing 
Regions (current US$ million and annual growth rates) 











Countries (1)  476,634  623,053  1,201,248  5.5%  7.6%  6.8% 
North Africa  13,964  25,828  32,336  13.1%   2.5%   6.2%  
West Africa  3,299  2,881  3,260  -2.7%   1.4%   -0.1%  
East Africa  1,774  2,811  4,281  9.6%   4.8%   6.5%  
Central Africa  975  1,735  1,013  12.2%   -5.8%   0.3%  
Southern Africa  13,159  26,795  27,016  15.3%   0.1%   5.3%  
S. Saharan Africa  23,930  42,341  51,856  12.1%  2.3%  5.7% 
S. Saharan Africa 
exc. S. Africa  12,454  18,301  26,941  8.0%  4.4%  5.7% 
South Asia  43,450  61,070  92,990  7.0%  4.8%  5.6% 
East Asia  181,450  263,090  625,332  7.7%  10.1%  9.2% 
Latin America  227,804  256,552  431,071  2.4%  5.9%  4.7% 
Source: World Bank, WDI2001 
Notes: Subtotals in the African regions are only for the following countries:  North Africa (4 countries): 
Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia; West Africa (3 countries): Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal; East 
Africa (6 countries): Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania and Uganda; Central Africa (2 
countries): Cameroon and Central African Republic; Southern Africa (5 countries): Malawi, 
Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
However, totals for Sub-Saharan Africa and other developing regions include all countries. 
(1) excludes the Middle East. 
Annex table 2. Total Manufactured Exports  for Sub-Saharan Africa and 
other Developing Regions (current US$ million and annual growth rates) 
  1985  1998  Growth rate 
(85-98) 
Developing 
Countries  194,049  987,647  13.3% 
North Africa  6,539  13,372  5.7%  
West Africa  489  874  4.6%  
East Africa  859  2,667  9.1%  
Central Africa  316  530  4.0%  
Southern Africa  5,508  14,436  7.7%  
S. Saharan Africa  7,172  18,507  7.6% 
S. Saharan Africa 
exc. S. Africa  2,210  5,172  6.8% 
South Asia  9,702  41,041  11.7% 
East Asia  118,429  685,847  14.5% 
Latin America  42,884  187,776  12.0% 
Source: Calculated from UN Comtrade database   
Notes: Subtotals in the African regions are only for the countries specified earlier 
(see annex tables for country level data). Total figures for developing countries 
do not match with subtotals for developing regions as these do not include all 
countries and Middle East countries are not given.  South Asia covers 
Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka; East Asia covers China, H. 
Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand; 
Latin America  includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, C Rica, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, 





















Annex table 3. Total manufactured exports in Africa (current US$ million) 
  1985  1998  Growth rate 
(85-98) 
Algeria  4,045  2,848  -2.7%  
Egypt  458  2,242  13.0%  
Morocco  1,200  3,108  7.6%  
Tunisia  836  5,173  15.0%  
North Africa  6,539  13,372  5.7% 
Ghana  119  396  9.7%  
Nigeria  216  177  -1.5%  
Senegal  154  300(b)  5.2%  
West Africa  489  874  4.6% 
Ethiopia  n.a  85(b)  n.a 
Kenya  341  829  7.1%  
Madagascar  52  124  6.9%  
Mauritius  407  1,602  11.1%  
Tanzania  57  93  3.8%  
Uganda  2  19  18.3%  
East Africa  859  2,667  9.1% 
Cameroon  269  477  4.5%  
CAR  48  53  0.8%  
Central Africa  316  530  4.0% 
Malawi  43  61(b)  2.8%  
Mozambique  62  60  -0.3%  
South Africa  4,962(a)  13,334  7.9%  
Zambia  80  107(b)  2.2%  
Zimbabwe  360  874  7.0%  
Southern Africa  5,508  14,436  7.7% 
Southern Africa  
exc. S. Africa  546  1,101  5.6%  
Source: Calculated from UN Comtrade database   
Notes: Regional subtotals are only for the countries shown 
(a)  data for 1986 
(b)  data for 1997 
Annex table 4. Share of Primary and Manufactured Exports in Total Exports for Nigeria and Selected African Comparators (%) 
  1985  2000   
Of which:  Of which:   
Total Exports 
(US$ ‘000) 
  Primary (%)  Manuf. (%) 
Total Exports 
(US$ ‘000) 






Nigeria  14,180,705  98.5%  1.5%  39,014,086  99.8%  0.2%  7.0% 
Ghana  527,933  77.4%  22.6%  1,035,557  54.0%  46.0%  4.6% 
Senegal  330,708  53.3%  46.7%  690,911  46.2%  53.8%  5.0% 
Kenya  953,860  64.3%  35.7%  1,551,569  62.6%  37.4%  3.3% 
South Africa  9,014,853  45.0%  55.0%  22,596,082  19.1%  80.9%  6.3% 
Zimbabwe  936,952  61.5%  38.5%  1,894,123.00  60.0%  40.0%  4.8% 
Algeria  10,148,814  60.1%  39.9%  19,739,451  81.4%  18.60%  4.5% 
Egypt  1,830,760  75.0%  25.0%  3,215,919  29.0%  71.0%  3.8% 
Morocco  2,164,257  44.5%  55.5%  6,698,882  26.6%  73.4%  7.8% 












Annex table 5. Technological structure of MVA for Sub-Saharan Africa and other 
Developing Regions (%) 
  1985  1998 
  MHT  LT  RB  MHT  LT  RB 
Developing 
Countries 
35.4%  21.6%  43.1%  37.8%  20.8%  41.3% 
North Africa  28.4%   27.4%   44.2%   28.1%   23.3%   48.7%  
West Africa  22.3%   17.8%   59.9%   29.4%   18.0%   52.6%  
East Africa  15.7%   28.0%   56.3%   15.9%   25.2%   59.0%  
Central Africa  15.6%   10.8%   73.6%   15.6%   8.6%   75.8%  
Southern Africa  35.1%   22.1%   42.8%   30.9%   20.4%   48.7%  
S. Saharan Africa  22.2%  19.7%  58.2%  22.9%  18.1%  59.0% 
S. Saharan Africa 
exc. S. Africa   21.5%  20.1%  58.5%  21.8%  18.3%  59.9% 
South Asia  32.6%  24.8%  42.6%  34.3%  32.0%  33.7% 
East Asia  44.3%  23.8%  31.9%  54.4%  17.6%  28.0% 
Latin America  42.5%  18.0%  39.6%  39.7%  15.7%  44.6% 
Source: Calculated from UNIDO (2002) 
Notes: For country coverage, see note in table 3. MHT stands for ‘medium and high 
technology’, LT for ‘low technology’ and RB for ‘resource based’. ’ 
Annex table 6. Technological structure of manufactured exports and growth rates (%) 
 
  1985  1998  Annual growth rates (85-98) 
  HT  MT  LT  RB  HT  MT  LT  RB  HT  MT  LT  RB 
Developing 
Countries 
11.6%  21.9%  32.3%  34.1%  28.2%  25.6%  28.0%  18.2%  21.3%  14.7%  12.1%  8.0% 
North Africa  0.5%   7.2%   13.4%   78.9%   2.5%   11.6%   38.7%   47.2%   19.5%   9.6%   14.6%   1.6%  
West Africa  2.0%   5.3%   7.2%   85.6%   0.6%   11.9%   12.2%   75.3%   -5.0%   11.3%   8.9%   3.5%  
East Africa  1.6%   5.4%   29.7%   63.4%   1.6%   5.4%   53.3%  39.8%   9.2%   9.1%   14.1%   5.3%  
Central Africa  0.7%   0.7%   3.8%   94.8%   0.3%   6.4%   9.6%   83.8%   -3.7%   23.0%   11.7%   3.1%  
Southern Africa  8.2%   22.4%   17.0%   52.4%   6.5%   30.9%   18.7%   43.9%   5.8%   10.4%   8.5%   6.2%  
S. Saharan Africa  6.6%  18.2%  17.3%  57.9%  5.4%  25.6%  23.1%  45.9%  5.8%  10.4%  10.0%  5.7% 
S. Saharan Africa 
exc. S. Africa  1.4%  11.6%  19.2%  67.8%  1.3%  11.5%  36.2%  50.9%  6.1%  6.7%  12.1%  4.4% 
South Asia  2.8%  9.2%  55.8%  32.3%  4.4%  11.4%  62.8%  21.4%  15.7%  13.6%  12.8%  8.2% 
East Asia  15.8%  23.3%  38.2%  22.7%  36.1%  23.6%  28.1%  12.1%  21.7%  14.3%  11.5%  8.8% 
Latin America  7.0%  24.8%  16.9%  51.3%  19.7%  37.2%  18.2%  24.9%  20.8%  15.1%  12.2%  5.5% 
Source: Calculated from the UN Comtrade database 
Notes: For country coverage, see note in table 3. HT stands for ‘high tech’, MT for ‘medium tech’, LT for ‘low tech’ and RB for ‘resource based’. 
Annual growth rates are calculated based on actual export figures and do not reflect the differences in export structures between 1985 and 1998. 





























Annex table 7. Enrolments in secondary and tertiary education 
 (% of relevant group) 
  Secondary  Tertiary 
  1985  1997  1985  1997 
Developing 
Countries   39  51  10  14 
North Africa  47  61  10  15 
West Africa  24  25  2  3 
East Africa  19  22  1  2 
Central Africa  20  27  2  3 
Southern Africa  18  39  2  5 
S. Saharan Africa  20  27  2  3 
S. Saharan Africa 
exc. S. Africa  20  25  2  3 
South Asia  32  49  4  5 
East Asia  56  69  14  25 
Latin America  50  60  18  22 
Source: World Bank, WDI2001 
Notes: Subtotals in the African regions are only for the countries specified 
before 
Annex figure 1. Enrolment in technical subjects 
(thousands)
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Annex table 8. Enterprise Productive R&D, 1998  





Per capita  
(US$ unit) 
Developing 
Countries  18,121.7  100%  4.20 
North Africa  26.3  0.1%   0.20 
West Africa  0.4  0.0%   0.00 
East Africa  0.5  0.0%   0.00 
Central Africa  0.0  0.0%   0.00 
Southern Africa  499.6  2.8%   5.43 
S. Saharan Africa  500.5  2.8%  0.78 
S. Saharan Africa 
exc. S. Africa  0.9  0.0%  0.00 
South Asia  397.6  2.2%  0.30 
East Asia  14,125.8  77.9%  8.70 
Latin America  2,783.7  15.4%  6.30 
Sources: Calculated from UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook 1994 and 1998, 
Iberoamerican Network of Science and Technology Indicators 
(www.ricyt.edu.ar), Central Banks and other national statistics.  
Notes: Subtotals in the African regions are only for the countries specified earlier 
(see annex tables for country level data). Total figures for developing countries 
do not match with subtotals for developing regions, as these do not include other 
countries in the region and Middle East countries.  
Annex figure 2. Inward FDI flows (US$ million)
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Annex figure 3. Technology licence payments (US$ 
million)
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Source:  World Bank, WDI2001










Annex figurs 4. Telephone mainlines and PCs, 1999
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